The Macedonian Question

An Anthropologist, Manning Nash, once said that “a language is a dialect with an army and a navy.” His point was that the languages of the world number far greater than the number of countries, and that further, the language of a country can be a very contentious matter. Macedonia is no exception.

From before the onset of Socialist Yugoslavia to the present, the literary Macedonian language has been a demarcating line. Writings of southwestern Macedonians in the 19^th & early 20^th centuries clearly show a different dialect of a south Slavic tongue similar to Bulgarian, but when Tito split Yugoslavia off from Stalin’s cominform—and grand Soviet Communist plan—post-WWII, he bolstered the development of the Macedonian “language” in order to forge a stronger Macedonian identity. The goal was to give this melting pot region of the southern Balkans a more distinct character in order to separate it from Soviet linked Bulgaria.

Politically, closed borders between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria meant things would go their own way. But culturally and linguistically, Macedonia shared a good deal with Bulgaria. A century ago the main cultural cities where Macedonians—including the famed revolutionaries who overthrew the Turks and the Ottoman Empire—went for education and international flavor were not so much the current capital, Skopje (which was then capital of the Ottoman province of Kosovo), but the capital of Bulgaria, Sofia, as well as the provincial Ottoman capital in southwestern Macedonia, Bitola, and the greater Macedonian port city of Thessaloniki/Solun (now in Greece). The majestic Lake Ohrid (which borders Albania), with its hundreds of Orthodox churches and monasteries, was the patriarchate of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, founded in the year 927. The Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC), however, didn't gain its autonomy from the Serbian church until 1959 and then declared autocephaly in 1967.

Therefore, a Bulgarian identity clearly preceded a Macedonian one, as Macedonia was more of a geographical reference point (though no doubt with its own culture and character). Early south Slav immigrants from the region to the US, for example, corroborate this: they claimed to be Bulgarian but from Macedonia. It’s akin to my being American, but from Indiana. The former is my political identity, but the latter is my geographical and cultural one.

How we perceive our identity is thus a changing, fluid notion, and the repercussions of this are unequivocally present in the “Macedonian Question” and today’s political climate. The Macedonian Question refers to the overlapping use of the name Macedonia to describe geographical and historical areas, languages, and peoples. For most of its millenia long history and until the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the territory of Macedonia was twice as large as today—covering what is now southwestern Bulgaria and northern Greece. More contemporarily, from the time of the Ottoman Empire, the region was increasingly populated by large numbers of Sephardic Jews, Vlachs, Turks, Greeks, Albanians, and Roma, in addition to Macedonians and other South Slavic groups such as Bulgarians and Serbs.

Consequently, with so many people and vying powers yet so little territory, Macedonia has had ongoing quarrels with its more powerful neighbors, all focusing on issues surrounding the development of an ethno-national Macedonian identity. With Serbia to the north, there is the conflict of Macedonia’s separation from the Serbian Orthodox Church and creation of the MOC.[1] Having strong kinship, trade, and former political ties to Macedonia, Serbs have seen the region as theirs, even calling it southern Serbia when they occupied it in the interwar period. Their presence was not appreciated, however, as one scholar on the region writes.

Macedonia at times appeared to exist in a state of virtual war between the population and the forces of government, which many civilians perceived as foreign. Against this backdrop violent clashes continued between armed bands and police, and assassins targeted Serbian officials, reinforcing the view that the Macedonian Question here remained unresolved and posed a vital threat to domestic order.[2]

Along with Greece, who got its spoils by receiving southern (Aegean) Macedonia, Serbia sought to divide the region then. Nearly a century later, Serbia may oppose the MOC but it is only Greece who truly counters Macedonia’s right to exist as a nation-state. Despite the US, most of the EU, and dozens of other countries’ recognition of Macedonia by its constitutional name—the Republic of Macedonia—Greece immaturely refuses to call it as such, calling it either FYROM (an acronym for “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”) or just Skopje.

Greece's irredentist claims to the Macedonian territory come from ancient Macedonia’s Hellenic ties. However, a more suitable explanation is that they seek to cover up the events of the past century. Indeed, fierce assimilation and draconian measures under the Greek dictatorship and until recently made Macedonians and other minorities into “Greeks.” Harassment, arrest, and imprisonment of those speaking the south Slavic tongue have been all too common in Aegean Macedonia. Thus, while perhaps the ancient home of democracy, modern Greece lacks any erudite traditions of yore by behaving as they have and blocking Macedonia’s entry into NATO—an issue all the more important not just for peace in the region but for international peace, as Russia clears the way for its re-igniting of the Cold War.

The last neighborly spat is with Bulgaria, who consider Macedonians to still be Bulgarian. What Bulgaria has cleverly done, and which many Macedonians have taken advantage of, is allow those who willingly claim Bulgarian identity to acquire Bulgarian citizenship and the valuable accompanying passport. This began five years or so ago, but now that Bulgaria is a member of the EU, that new political affiliation is all the more valuable for visa restricted Macedonians (who can only visit three of their five neighbors without a visa—Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia). This surge in Bulgarian affiliation is most evident on the streets and roads of Skopje and the country—Bulgarian license plates abound like never before. Whether it will affect the identity of those who took the carrot remains to be seen, but 21^st century Macedonia is at present a clearly demarcated, autonomous, and democratic nation.

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[1] This even came up when I mentioned my Macedonian affiliations at the Serbian Church in Indianapolis on Easter this year.

[2] Brown, The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation, 42.